Secret Sharing from the perspective of threshold schemes has been wellstudied over the past decade. Threshold schemes, however, can only handle a small fraction of the secret sharing functions which we may wish to form. For example, if it is desirable to divide a secret among four participants A , B : C, and D in such a way that either A together with B can reconstruct the secret or C together with D can reconstruct the secret, then threshold schemes (even with weighting) are provably insufficient.
Introduction
The threshold schemes for secret sharing introduced by Blakley ([Blak79] ) and Shamir ([Sham79] ) have found many applications in recent years. There are, however, many secret sharing applications which do not fit into the model of threshold schemes.
In a recent paper ([ISN87] ), Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki describe a general method of secret sharing whereby a secret can be divided among a set P of trustees such that any "qualified subset" of P can reconstruct the secret and such that unqualified subsets cannot. As they point out, it is most sensible to talk only about families of qualified subsets (or access s t r u c t u r e s ) A which satisfy the property It is hard t o imagine a meaningful method of sharing a secret which does not satisfy this property.
The method of Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki can be roughly described as follows. For each of the (up to order 21' 1) sets of the access structure A, divide the secret among S. Goldwasser (Ed.): Advances in Cryptology -CRYPT0 '88, LNCS 403, pp. 27-35, 1990 0 Spnnger-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1990 each member of the set.' Thus, in the worst case, each of the n trustees may have to hold on the order of 2" shares.
This paper gives a fax simpler and more efficient method of developing a secret sharing scheme for any monotone access structure. The idea is to translate the access structure into a monotone formula.
Each variable in the formula is associated with a trustee in P, and the value of the formula is true if and only if the set of variables which are true corresponds to a subset of P which is in the access structure (ie. the variables which are true correspond to a subset of trustees qualified to reconstruct the secret). This formula is then used as a template to describe how a secret is to be divided into shares. Since every monotone function can implemented using just AND operators and OR operators, it is sufficient to show how to divide a secret "across" each of these two operators. It will be shown later how these formulae can be made more efficient by using general THRESHOLD operators and appealing to traditional threshold schemes.
Let pl and p2 be trustees in P . To divide a secret s into shares such that pl and p2 can reconstruct s, pl can be given a value s1 and p2 given a value s2 such that s = s1+ s2. If s is selected from the range 0 5 s < rn. then s1 and s2 can be chosen uniformly from this range subject to the constraint that s = (sl + 3 2 ) mod m. In this case it can be shown in a very strong sense that neither pl nor p 2 can, without the other, obtain any information whatsoever about s.
To divide a secret s into shares such that pl or pz can reconstruct s , pl and p2 can simply both be given the value s. With these two building blocks, it is easy to see how to construct a secret sharing scheme for any monotone access structure.
For instance, in the earlier example, a secret sharing scheme is sought for which either A together with B or C together with D can reconstruct the secret value s. The corresponding access structure can be written as ( ( A A B ) V (C A D)). Thus, to share a secret s according to this access structure, the secret is first moved across the O R yielding a situation in which the secret s now must be shared among AB and among CD. The value s is now moved across the two AYD operators, yielding shares S A , SB, sc, and SD belonging respectively to A, B , C, and D such that S A + S B = s and sc + SD = S . If the shares generated when a value is moved across an AND gate are random and independent of other selections, then it is not hard to show in a very strong sense that insufficient subsets of trustees obtain no information whatsoever about the original secret value. There is, of course, no need to limit these gates to two inputs since both of the above operations generalize directly to gates with arbitrary fan-in. In general, a value can be moved across an arbitrary THRESHOLD operator by appealing to a traditional threshold scheme such as the Shamir scheme ([Sham79]). If some intermediate value s in a formula is to be moved across a threshold operator with n arguments and threshold k, the secret s is divided among the n arguments according to a (k, n)-threshold scheme, and these shares become the intermediate values for the next level of the formula. ' There is actually some minimization done w will be described later.
Since AND operators and OR operators are specid cases of THRESHOLD operators, it would suffice to apply the Shamir threshold scheme to each operator of the formula. It is, however, often simpler to apply the direct methods above. Although the method of moving a secret across an OR operator described above does correspond exactly to Shamir's method of constructing a (1,n)-threshold scheme, the method given of moving a secret across an AND operator is computationally simpler than a Shamir (n, n)-threshold scheme. In addition, the threshold schemes given by Shamir and others have limitations which are not present in the scheme presented here. These limitations will be discussed later.
The method described by Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki in [ISN87] corresponds precisely to the case of minimal CNF-formulae in which conjunctions are formed by use of (n, n)-threshold schemes rather than by simple sums.
It is of course true that every monotone formula can be expressed as a CNFformula and that there are a great many monotone formulae for which the CNFformula is the smallest possible representation. However, there are also a great many cases in which the use of general monotone formulae (especially when arbitrary threshold operators are allowed) gives a much smaller formula than the CNF-formula. The number of shares which must be given to each trustee in these schemes as well as the complexity of reconstructing the secret from its shares are directly related to the size of the formula.
Preliminaries
To begin with, we must formally define the necessary access structures.
Definition
A C_ 2' such that Given a set P , a monotone access structure on P is a family of subsets
A € d , A C A ' G P + A ' E A .
Definition Let P be a set. The set V of variables indexed by P is the set V =
Definition Given a monotone function F on variables indexed by a set P, the access structure defined by F is the set of subsets of A of P for which F is true precisely when the variables indexed by A are set to true.
It is clear that for every monotone function F , the access structure defined by F is a monotone access structure.
Definition For a given set P and an monotone access structure A on P, define F ( A ) to be the set of monotone formulae on IPI variables such that for every formula F E F ( d ) , the output of F is true if and only if the true variables in F correspond exactly to a set A E A.
Note that F, F' E F(d) implies that F and F' denote the same function. They may, however, represent entirely different formulae to express this function.
Generalized Secret Sharing
We can now begin to d e h e secret sharing schemes. We start with a standard definition for threshold schemes.
Definition Given a set S of possible secret values, a (Ic,n)-threshold scheme on S is a (randomized) method of dividing each s E S into an array of shares [sl, s2,. . . , s,,] with each s; E S such that 1. Given any set of k or more of the si, the secret value s is easily reconstructible. 2. Given any set of fewer than k of the s; , the secret value s is completely undetermined in an information theoretic sense.
Shamir's polynomially based threshold scheme (see [Sham79] ) satisfies the above definition whenever IS/ is a prime greater than n. It is not hard to remove the restriction that IS1 be prime by, for instance, factoring 1st and using Chinese remaindering to encode secrets and shares. This kind of encoding, however, requires that all prime factors of IS1 be greater than n.
Other For certain access structures, every generalized threshold scheme m u t be able to assign multiple shares to each trustee (see theorem 3). In this case, we use S;,j to denote the jth share given to trustee p i .
Definition Given a set P and a monotone access structure A on P , a generalized secret sharing scheme for A is a method of dividing a secret 5 into shares s;,j such that 1.
2.
When A E A, the secret s can be reconstructed from the shares U Usi,j.
When A $ A, the shares u US;^ give (in an information theoretic sense) no information whatsoever about the value of s.
We now define a generalized secret sharing scheme which satisfies the above definition.
Assume that the secret domain S is fixed to be the set (0,1,. . . , m -1) for some positive integer rn. We can now formally define the generalized secret sharing scheme described in section 1. Let $(s, F ) be the random function for s E S and a monotone formula F defined as follows. If operators are allowed to have more than two arguments and if THRESHOLD operators are to be used, we add the following. A(F1, F? , . . . , Fn)) = U $(s;, F,), where the s; are chosen uniformly from l < i < n S such that s = (C:=l 3;) mod rn.
$(s,
We now show that for every monotone access structure A and every monotone formula F E F(d), the secret sharing scheme defined by $ ( s , F ) satisfies the definition of a generalized secret sharing scheme. 5; FI ,I%, . . . , F,) = [SI, s2,. . . , s,,] . By assumption, a threshold scheme $ k allows sets of fewer than k shareholders to obtain no information at all about the value of s. If A is a set of trustees not in -4, then the membersof A can obtain direct information about fewer than k of the s;. Again by independence, the shares held by the members of A provide no information whatsoever about the value of s. I Finally, we show that there are access structures which cannot be realized without giving multiple (or extra large) shares to some trustee.
Theorem 3 There ezasts access structures for which any generahzed secret sharing scheme must give s o m e trustee shares which are from a domain larger than that of the secret.
Proof:
Consider the access structure A defined by the formula ( ( A A B ) v ( B A C) v ( C A D ) ) , and fix a value a to be the share held by A. A and C are together n o t sufficient to determine any information about the value of the secret 5 . Thus, the value held by C must be completely determined by the value held by A .
Now since C and D are together sufficient to compute the secret value s , the value held by C together with the value held by D is sufficient to compute the secret value 5. However, the value held by A completely determines the value held by C. Thus, the value held by A together with the d u e held by D is sufficient to compute s. This violates the premise that A and D are insufficient.
I 4 Generalized Secret Sharing Homomorphisms
In [Bena86] and [Bena87], Benaloh describes a homomorphism property that is present in many threshold schemes which allows shares of multiple secrets to be combined to form "composite shares" which are shares of a composition of the secrets. Such secret sharing homomorphisms aIso apply to the generalized secret sharing scheme presented here.
For instance, if the shares of a secret value z (drawn from a fixed secret domain S = {0,1,. . . , m -1)) are added to the corresponding shares of a similarly chosen secret d u e y, then the sums represent shares of the value (z + y) mod m.
The applications of secret sharing homomorphisms includes fault-tolerant verifiable secret-ballot elections as well as verifiable secret sharing. The methods of verifiable secret sharing developed for threshold schemes in [Bend61 and [Bend71 and also by Feldrnan in [Feld87] can be used for generalized secret sharing too. The approach used by Feldman is actually somewhat better suited to these purposes. Here, the secret is distributed in such a way as to enable each trustee to, without further interaction, verify that its share is a well-formed and valid share of the secret.
The main requirement of these schemes is the presence of an appropriate homomorphism property, and the homomorphism property described above turns out to be sufficient.
Conclusions
This paper has shown how generalized secret sharing can be achieved in a method which is simpler and more efficient than in any previous scheme. There are, however, many cases in which this method is still unable to be applied efficiently.
For any given polynomial P, the number of n-variable monotone formulae of size no more than P ( n ) is exponential in P(n). However, the total number of monotone functions on n variables is doubly exponential in n. Therefore, most monotone access structures cannot be realized with a polynomially large number of polynomially sized shares.
Further methods of secret sharing which can efficiently realize additional access structures and an analysis of precisely what access structures can be efficiently realized are interesting areas for future research.
